EXPORTED

U.S. Expansion Risk Verdict

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Company	**Confidential — Dutch Enterprise Workflow Automation SaaS**
Country of Origin	Netherlands
Sector	Enterprise SaaS / Workflow Automation
Stage at US Entry	Series A
US Entry	Q3 2025 · 14 months into expansion
Prepared	September 2026 · Confidential — for client use only

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At 14 months into a US expansion with active enterprise pilots and no converted ARR, this company is approaching the documented inflection point where one structural decision determines the outcome of its next funding round. The Exported case log records 91 Series A cases in this exact configuration — Operational Usefulness Trap, Enterprise ACV, Direct Enterprise Sales, no founder relocation: those that hired a US commercial leader show a **21.7% negative outcome rate**. Those that did not show **87.5%**. That gap — documented across comparable cases, not modeled — is the central finding of this verdict. If the next round is targeted for Q2–Q4 2027, institutional investors will expect a demonstrable US proof point no later than month 24. At current trajectory, the base case produces insufficient US ARR to constitute that proof point. The corrective window is approximately 90 days.

PRISM™ RISK SCORE

Overall PRISM™ Score	74 / 100	HIGH RISK

Dimension	Score	Level	What it means for this company
Timing Risk	**11 / 20**	**Moderate**	US workflow-automation market mid-cycle; window narrowing as US-native AI-adjacent competitors extend integrations
Trigger Risk	**14 / 20**	**High**	Expansion triggered by investor/fundraising pressure — no documented US inbound demand at entry
GTM Risk	**17 / 20**	**High**	Direct Sales into enterprise requires 9–14 month procurement cycles; zero US brand recognition, no US reference customers
Execution Risk	**17 / 20**	**High**	No founder relocation, no US commercial leader; all commercial activity runs on a 6-hour time lag from the Netherlands

Signal Misread	**15 / 20**	**High**	Enterprise pilots interpreted as US market validation; pilots funded from IT evaluation budget lines, not strategic procurement

Primary risk driver: Execution Risk — No US-based commercial leader means no buyer trust anchoring, no access to US procurement networks, and no ability to compress a 9–14 month enterprise sales cycle. Every month without this hire is a month of operating costs applied to a motion that cannot close without it. This is not an observation — it is the documented mechanism behind the 87.5% negative outcome rate in comparable cases that made the same choice.

VERDICT

Fourteen months into the US expansion, the company is operating a Direct Sales enterprise motion without the commercial infrastructure that motion requires. Enterprise pilot accounts are active and consuming management attention. None have a confirmed economic buyer sponsoring the procurement decision. The trigger for expansion was investor timeline, not documented US market demand — a distinction that consistently produces execution patterns optimized for pipeline appearance rather than pipeline conversion. The PRISM™ score of 74 places this company above the top quartile of risk within its archetype (Q1: 51 · median: 55 · Q3: 61). Among documented cases in this archetype, friction onset occurs within the first 12 months in 12% of cases and accelerates sharply between months 24 and 36, where a further 42% of cases first hit structural friction — this company is currently inside the quiet window that precedes that acceleration. One corrective action changes the outcome distribution more than any other: the presence or absence of a US commercial leader. The case log is unambiguous on this point. The verdict that follows is built around that finding.

1. ARCHETYPE MATCH

Operational Usefulness Trap

The product solves a real workflow-automation problem at the operational team level. The pilots confirm this — the product works and the users inside each account want it. The trap is that team-level utility and team-level advocacy do not automatically produce executive budget ownership in the US enterprise market. The US procurement decision for a $150K–$300K annual contract requires a CFO- or COO-level sponsor who owns the P&L line the product impacts and who can frame the purchase as a financial outcome, not an operational improvement. That sponsor has not been identified in any of the current pilot accounts. Without that identification, the pilots will expire. The documented case log shows this pattern with high consistency.

Historical outcome — this archetype, Exported case log (n=394):

Outcome	Rate
Successful / Scaling	19.8%
Partial Success	30.7%
Acquired	18.8%
Stalled	18.5%
Retreated / Exited	8.4%
Partial Failure / Pivot	3.0%
Hidden Failure	0.8%

Combined negative outcomes — Stalled, Retreated / Exited, Partial Failure / Pivot, and Hidden Failure — represent 30.7% of documented cases in this archetype: not a high-risk archetype on average. Among Netherlands-originated companies specifically in this archetype, the case log records 5 negative outcomes out of 17 total cases — a negative rate of 29.4%, materially in line with the archetype baseline. The company's current configuration is consistent with the cases that produced the negative outcomes, not with the majority that reached a positive one.

Metric	Documented figure
Series A cases in this archetype — total	126 documented cases
Negative outcome rate — no US exec hire (exact config)	87.5% (7 of 8 cases)
Negative outcome rate — US exec hire made (exact config)	21.7% (18 of 83 cases)
PRISM™ score range, this archetype	Q1: 51 · Median: 55 · Q3: 61 (client score: 74)

2. CALIBRATED PROBABILITY

PRISM™ Layer 2 model outputs are calibrated against documented outcomes in the Exported case log. The current-trajectory figures below are the live output of running this company's profile through the calibrated XGBoost classifier (rolling-origin CV AUC 0.8931, trained on 3,151 documented cases). The revised-probability table shows two corrective scenarios drawn directly from documented cohort data — not modeled projections.

Current trajectory — no corrective action

Outcome	Probability	Basis
Stalled or worse within 30 months	**~75%**	Series A OUP cases without US exec hire in this exact configuration: 87.5% negative. Broader Series A archetype cohort (n=126): 30.7% negative — the gap reflects how much this specific configuration concentrates the risk.
Partial Success	**~12%**	One pilot converts; insufficient ARR for an institutional next-round narrative at this stage.
Successful / Scaling	**~13%**	Requires an unexpected US demand-pull signal not yet visible in the current configuration.

Revised probability — if corrective actions are executed

Scenario	Negative outcome	Positive outcome	Change vs. current
Current — no action	**~75%**	**~25%**	Baseline
US commercial hire made (broad Series A cohort, n=475)	**26.5%**	**73.5%**	–48.5pp negative · +48.5pp positive
US hire made in this exact configuration (n=83)	**21.7%**	**78.3%**	–53.3pp negative · +53.3pp positive

The 21.7% negative rate in the final row is not a projection — it is the documented outcome distribution of the 83 Series A Operational Usefulness Trap cases in the Exported log, at Enterprise ACV with a Direct Sales motion and no founder relocation, that hired a US commercial leader. This is the single largest documented outcome delta available to this company: a 65.8-point swing in negative-outcome rate attributable to one decision.

Median months to first US revenue — with exec hire	18 months (n=256, this archetype)
Founder relocated — negative rate, this archetype	12.9% (n=31)
Founder not relocated — negative rate, this archetype	32.2% (n=363)
Time to first major US friction (Layer 4, concordance 0.7904)	Median 27 months from US entry · 87.9% friction-free through 24 months, dropping to 46.4% by month 36

3. COMPARABLE CASES

Four cases drawn from the Exported case log — the closest documented matches by archetype, stage, and configuration, returned by Layer 3's cosine-similarity engine (12 PCA components, 84.1% variance explained). Three represent the failure path from this starting position; one represents the corrective path.

Case 1 — Confidential Western European Insurtech

Western Europe · Series C+ / Late · Enterprise ACV · PRISM™ Score: 68 / 100 · HIGH RISK

Outcome: Retreated / Exited	
Signal interpreted as positive	Aggressive US expansion pace and rapidly growing logo count appeared to confirm that the platform had found a repeatable US motion worth scaling into.
What the signal actually indicated	Growth was funded by capital deployment, not earned through unit economics. The expansion pace outran the company's ability to service and retain the accounts it was signing.
How friction materialised	By month 18–24, support and delivery costs per account exceeded what the pricing model could sustain. Renewal conversations surfaced the gap. Enterprise procurement teams began requesting proof of long-term viability the company could not provide.
Economic consequence	Operational burn and an EU regulatory review compounded the US losses. The US entity was wound down; capital deployed to the motion was written off in full.
Relevance to your situation	The pilot-as-validation misread is structurally identical. Enterprise engagement in the US produces genuine user activity — it does not produce economic-buyer confirmation. The gap between those two things is where the capital is lost.

Case 2 — Confidential Nordic Mobility / Transportation Platform

Nordics · Growth Stage · Mid-market ACV · PRISM™ Score: 72 / 100 · HIGH RISK

Outcome: Retreated / Exited	
Signal interpreted as positive	Active partner conversations with US transit agencies looked like a path to regulatory enforcement power that would drive adoption.
What the signal actually indicated	Procurement cycles inside US public transit agencies run far longer than the company's runway allowed, and the company had no real leverage over the dominant private ride-hail incumbents already entrenched with those agencies.
How friction materialised	By month 12–18, partner discussions had not converted to a single signed agency contract. Data-sharing cooperation from incumbent platforms did not materialize. US pipeline stalled entirely on partner dependency.
Economic consequence	US market entry costs were written off. The company retreated to its home region, where the regulatory relationships it had already built produced revenue the US market never did.
Relevance to your situation	Partnership access was mistaken for buyer commitment. Your enterprise pilots carry the same structural risk: activity and engagement are not the same as a funded, sponsored purchase decision.

Case 3 — Confidential UK Fintech / E-commerce Lending Platform

UK & Ireland · Series C+ / Late · Enterprise ACV · PRISM™ Score: 68 / 100 · HIGH RISK

Outcome: Hidden Failure	
Signal interpreted as positive	Signed memoranda of understanding with several large US retail partners suggested a live, converting pipeline heading into the next fiscal year.
What the signal actually indicated	The MOUs were non-binding expressions of interest, not funded commitments. Real activity was occurring — meetings, pilots, integration work — without a budget owner attached to any of it.
How friction materialised	Each MOU aged past its original review date without escalating to a signed contract. The company continued reporting the MOUs as pipeline internally long after they had effectively lapsed, masking the true state of US traction from its own board.
Economic consequence	Burn continued against a pipeline that did not exist in practice. The gap between reported and real pipeline was not resolved until a subsequent funding round diligence process surfaced it.
Relevance to your situation	Paper commitment was mistaken for revenue commitment — the exact pilot-to-ARR gap risk present in this profile. An MOU or a pilot agreement is not evidence of a funded decision until an economic buyer has been named.

Case 4 — Corrective Path — Confidential UK Fintech / Brokerage & Wealth Platform

UK & Ireland · Series B · Mid-market ACV · PRISM™ Score: 70 / 100 · HIGH RISK · Valuation at exit: $410M

Outcome: Acquired	
Entry signal	A large signed-up waitlist ahead of US launch was read internally as validated future demand — genuinely high interest, not yet economically qualified.
The friction that emerged	Waitlist size did not translate to activated, paying accounts at anywhere near the expected rate. Early conversion and 90-day retention badly underperformed the model built at fundraising.
What was done differently	A US commercial lead with sector-specific buyer relationships was hired before month 20. The company stopped treating waitlist size as a leading indicator and rebuilt its funnel around a single qualified-economic-buyer definition. Onboarding was redesigned around the specific outcome that qualified buyer cared about.
Outcome	Activated-account conversion recovered within two quarters of the reframe. The corrected cohort's retention and expansion economics became the acquisition thesis: the company was acquired at a $410M valuation, with the US cohort cited as the primary strategic asset.

Pattern across cases 1–3: all three entered with a strong activity-based signal — expansion pace, partner conversations, or signed MOUs — that was structurally incompatible with what the US market actually required to convert. None had a US commercial leader in place before the signal was acted on. All three experienced friction inside the 12–24 month window. **Case 4** succeeded from a comparable starting score because the team stopped trusting the activity signal, made the commercial hire before month 20, and rebuilt the funnel around a qualified economic buyer. That sequence — and specifically that timing — is what the data prescribes here.

4. WHAT YOU ARE MISREADING

1. Enterprise pilots as US product-market fit

A pilot in the US enterprise context is funded from a discretionary IT evaluation budget line — typically $25K–$75K, approved by a Director or VP of Operations. The person who approves a pilot is structurally different from the person who approves a $150K–$300K annual contract: one is a budget consumer, the other is a P&L owner. The Operational Usefulness Trap archetype is defined by exactly this gap. In 30.7% of documented cases in this archetype, the pilot phase produced genuine user engagement and internal advocacy — and still did not convert. The correct interpretation of active enterprise pilots at month 14 with no economic buyer confirmed in any of them is: you have active evaluation relationships, not sales opportunities. The difference is the presence or absence of the budget owner.

2. Investor-driven timing as equivalent to US market pull

The trigger for this expansion was investor and fundraising pressure — documented in the intake profile. When the expansion trigger is capital-side push rather than US-side pull, the execution pattern that follows is consistently different: the team optimizes for activity metrics that demonstrate US presence rather than conversion metrics that demonstrate US demand. Pilots, conference attendance, and US entity formation all look like progress from the home-market perspective — they are not the same as a US buyer reaching inbound, or a US customer referencing the product to procurement. Case 4 succeeded in part because the corrective sequence created a qualified-buyer signal rather than assuming one existed. This company does not yet have that signal. The corrective sequence must create it, not assume it.

3. Direct Sales velocity without US presence

US enterprise procurement at the $150K–$300K ACV level is a relationship function before it is a product function. The buyer's question is not 'is this product capable' — the pilot already answers that. The buyer's question is 'do I trust this team to be a strategic vendor for the next three years.' That trust is built through in-person presence at industry events, warm introductions through shared professional networks, and informal access that a remote team operating on a 6-hour lag cannot systematically build. Among Series A EU companies running Direct Sales into enterprise without a US-based commercial leader, the documented outcome gap is more than four to one in negative outcomes versus those with a US hire in place — 87.5% against 21.7% in this exact configuration.

5. PRIMARY RISK DRIVERS

1. No US Commercial Leader

No single variable in this archetype has a larger documented impact on outcome than the presence or absence of a US commercial leader. This is not a general principle — it is a specific finding from the 91 Series A Operational Usefulness Trap cases in the Exported log at this exact configuration: 21.7% negative rate with a hire, 87.5% negative rate without. The mechanism is not that a US executive is generically 'better at sales' — it is that US enterprise procurement requires someone embedded in the relevant professional network who can identify the economic buyer inside an account, access that person through a trusted introduction, and build the relationship before the procurement cycle starts. That function cannot be performed remotely at the velocity US enterprise requires.

Consequence: Existing pilots expire without economic buyer engagement. Pipeline resets. The correction cost at month 20 is materially higher than the correction cost at month 15 — pilot champions rotate out of roles, relationships go cold, and next-round timeline pressure reduces negotiating leverage on the hire itself.

2. No Confirmed Economic Buyer in Any Pilot Account

Across the active pilot accounts, there is no documented confirmation that the budget owner for a $150K+ annual contract has been identified, engaged, or shown an ROI framing. The pilot champions — the operational team members using the product — are not the same people who control the procurement budget. In US enterprise, the champion and the buyer are frequently different individuals, in different reporting lines, with different success metrics. A pilot that ends without the economic buyer engaged is not a lost sale — it is a sales process that was never started with the right person.

Consequence: Active pilots are currently tracking toward expiration without conversion. The documented conversion rate for pilots in this archetype without economic buyer confirmation sits at the bottom of the range across the case log. Identifying and engaging the economic buyer in each account before month 18 is a prerequisite for any other corrective action to have effect.

3. Product Positioned for EU Operational Buyers, Not US P&L Owners

The current product narrative, website, and sales materials were built to address European operational procurement language: efficiency, process quality, compliance, team productivity. The US enterprise CFO and COO who must ultimately approve a $150K+ contract think in different terms: cost reduction expressed as a dollar figure, liability exposure reduced to a specific amount, or revenue-operations improvement translatable to pipeline impact. Without a US-specific economic outcome claim — one number, one buyer persona, one P&L line — Direct Sales conversations in the US will continue to produce 90-day evaluation cycles that do not resolve. This is not a product problem. It is a framing problem, and it is the most quickly correctable of the three primary drivers.

Consequence: Every Direct Sales conversation conducted without this reframe deepens the wrong-positioning pattern and makes the corrective repositioning harder. The US buyers who engage now will characterize this company as an 'operational tool' rather than a 'strategic investment' — a categorization that determines which budget line it competes for.

6. LIKELY OUTCOME — IF UNCHANGED

Base case — ~75% probability: Stalled → Partial Failure / Pivot

Months 15–20: active pilot accounts enter their final evaluation phase. Without economic buyer confirmation, most expire without conversion. One may extend on a no-cost basis to allow internal evaluation to continue, consuming management attention without producing ARR. US operating costs — entity, travel, team time, events — continue at an estimated $70K–$130K per quarter with no corresponding revenue generation. The board identifies the absence of US ARR as a funding risk in month 18–20 and begins discussion of reducing US investment. Months 20–26: GTM strategy is revised. Either a product-led motion is attempted, the company pivots to a mid-market ICP, or the US team is reduced to a single enterprise sales representative. Home-market operations remain the primary revenue driver. The next funding round is either delayed, raised at a reduced valuation, or not raised on the original timeline.

Downside case — ~12% probability: Retreated / Exited

A next round attempted in 2027 with under $300K in documented US ARR. The institutional lead investor declines to support at target valuation. A bridge round is required to extend runway. Bridge terms include a US investment freeze as a covenant. US entity costs become unsustainable without continued investment; US operations are dissolved or mothballed within two to three quarters. Capital deployed to US operations since entry — an estimated $1.2M–$2.2M — is written off. This outcome is three to five times more probable if no US commercial hire is made in the next six months.

Upside case — ~13% probability: Partial Success / Breakthrough

One of the active pilots converts to a $150K–$300K paid annual contract before month 20. The conversion requires: (a) a US commercial leader identifying and engaging the CFO or COO in the account before month 18, (b) an ROI framing built around a specific dollar-denominated outcome for that economic buyer's P&L, and (c) a procurement cycle managed by someone with US enterprise procurement experience. One converted customer with documented renewal intent changes the funding narrative and the probability distribution for all subsequent US pipeline — the case log shows that Series A companies in this archetype that convert their first US enterprise customer go on to close a second within 6–9 months at a materially higher rate than their baseline archetype average.

Capital consequence: at current EU/EU-adjacent startup operating-cost benchmarks for a US Direct Sales enterprise motion, US-specific spend — entity, team time, travel, events, legal — runs at approximately $70K–$130K per quarter. Over the remaining 10 months of the base-case trajectory, that represents $230K–$430K of additional US-specific capital consumed without a converted customer. Against the documented base-case outcome — under $300K US ARR by month 26 — this produces a capital efficiency ratio that no institutional investor will underwrite at the next round. The corrective action required to change this trajectory costs less than one quarter of continued base-case burn.

Stranded Capital Exposure Assessment

At the documented ~75% base-case probability, capital currently deployed to the US commercial motion is projected to produce a negative return. The table below quantifies each capital exposure category against the documented outcome distribution for this archetype and configuration.

Capital exposure item	12-month estimate	Assessment
US entity, legal, and compliance costs	$25K–$45K	Fully stranded under base-case trajectory
US travel, field presence, and events	$40K–$75K	Stranded unless at least one pilot converts to ARR

Management time — cost equivalent, home-market based	$65K–$100K	Stranded if no economic buyer confirmed in any pilot
US commercial infrastructure — tools, outside counsel, recruiting	$35K–$70K	Partially recoverable only if hire is made within 90 days
Total 12-month US capital at risk	**$165K–$290K**	At 75% probability: expected stranded capital ≈ $124K–$218K
Expected US ARR — base case (month 26)	<$300K	Capital efficiency ratio <0.6× — below institutional threshold for the next round

Capital Allocation Position

Condition	Recommended position
Continue and increase US investment	Only if: a US commercial hire is made within 90 days AND an economic buyer is confirmed in at least one pilot account before month 18. Both conditions must be met.
Maintain current US investment level	**Not recommended.** Current level produces pilot-cycle burn without conversion-probability improvement. Maintaining without the corrective hire is capital spent on the base-case trajectory.
Reduce US investment	If neither corrective condition is met within 90 days, reducing US spend to a single relationship manager while rebuilding the commercial case is the capital-preserving decision. Attempting to scale the current motion will accelerate the downside case.

7. ENRICHMENT FACTOR ANALYSIS

Five structured enrichment factors collected at intake, benchmarked against documented outcome distributions in the Exported case log:

Factor	Client profile	Assessment	Documented impact
Founder relocated to US	No	**Unfavourable**	Not-relocated founders in this archetype: 32.2% negative outcome rate (n=363). Relocated: 12.9% (n=31). The gap amplifies in Direct Sales enterprise motions, where physical presence in buyer markets is a velocity multiplier.
US executive hired in year one	No	**Critical — highest-impact variable**	Series A, this exact configuration, with exec hire: 21.7% negative. Without: 87.5% negative. This is the largest single-variable documented outcome delta in this archetype.
Category creation required	No	**Favourable**	Workflow automation is an established US procurement category — this profile does not carry the market-education tax that category-creation cases show (52.1% negative rate, n=167, DB-wide).
ACV tier	Enterprise	**Challenging at this stage**	Enterprise ACV at Series A with no US reference customers produces the longest documented runway-to-first-revenue configuration in the case log for this archetype.
GTM motion	Direct Sales	**Appropriate — but infrastructure-dependent**	Direct Sales is the correct motion for Enterprise ACV. The documented outcome gap exists not because the motion is wrong, but because it cannot be executed effectively without a US-based commercial leader embedded in buyer networks.

No founder relocation, no US executive, and Enterprise ACV at Series A is the highest-friction configuration for this archetype in the Exported case log among companies that do not also require category creation. Of the unfavourable factors, the US executive hire is the only one that can be corrected within the funding-round window — and it is also the one with the largest documented impact. The founder-relocation decision has a smaller and less certain outcome impact at this stage; the exec hire is the lever that moves the distribution.

8. WHAT MUST CHANGE FIRST

The following four actions are sequenced in order of documented impact and temporal dependency. Actions 2, 3, and 4 are each contingent on Action 1 being in motion — they amplify an effective commercial leader; without one, they are activities without a conversion mechanism.

1. Hire a US commercial leader with this archetype's specific buyer profile — decision within 30 days

The hire must have existing relationships with VP/SVP Operations, COO, or CFO-level buyers in the target sector — not enterprise SaaS experience in general, sector-specific buyer access. The documented outcome gap between Series A Operational Usefulness Trap cases with and without this hire, in this exact configuration, is 87.5% negative versus 21.7% negative. That delta does not exist for any other single corrective action in the case log for this archetype. The search process must begin within 30 days to allow for a 60–90 day close timeline and 3–6 months of ramp before the funding narrative window closes.

Decision window: Window: 30 days to initiate search. 90 days to close. If the hire is not in seat by month 17, the pilot expiration cycle begins before the executive can affect it.

2. Identify the economic buyer in each pilot account — within the next 45 days

In each active pilot account, map the procurement decision chain to the budget owner: who controls the P&L line that a $150K+ annual contract would sit against, who has signed off on comparable software investments in the past 18 months, and what the approval process is for a contract at this ACV. The pilot champion must be asked directly to facilitate an introduction to that person, or the company must make direct executive outreach above the champion's level. If the economic buyer in an account is not identifiable or accessible within 45 days, that pilot should be deprioritized in favor of net-new outreach where economic buyer access can be established from the first meeting.

Decision window: Window: 45 days. After this point, pilot timelines are inside their final evaluation phase and economic buyer introductions become emergency escalations rather than relationship development.

3. Rebuild the US positioning around one economic outcome for one buyer title — within 60 days

The current product narrative addresses operational efficiency and process quality — the outcomes an operational team member uses to justify a pilot request. They are not the outcomes a US CFO or COO uses to justify a $150K annual contract commitment. The new positioning must state one specific outcome — a number — that a US P&L owner recognizes as material to their goals: "$X in operational cost eliminated per year," "Y% reduction in process failure rate that translates to $Z in avoided cost." This reframe must be validated in the existing pilot accounts before it is deployed in new outreach.

Decision window: Window: 60 days. The new positioning must be in use before the US commercial hire begins building pipeline — so the first conversations they have are with the correct framing.

4. Narrow ICP to one vertical and one buyer title for the next 18 months — decision within 30 days

The current pilot accounts likely span multiple verticals or buyer configurations. That breadth is natural in an early US exploration phase — it is incompatible with building the reference base that closes credible US ARR for the next round. Identify the single vertical where the economic buyer is most accessible, the competitive set is least entrenched, and the ROI case is most specific and quantifiable. One reference customer in that vertical is worth more to the funding narrative than several partial-conversion pilots across different verticals.

Decision window: Window: 30 days to decide. The US commercial hire must be briefed on the chosen ICP in their first week — if the ICP decision has not been made, the hire loses the first 30–60 days of ramp to ICP discovery the company could have done in advance.

What not to do first: (1) Do not build a channel or partner programme before achieving direct sales wins. Channel partners evaluate the sales programmes of the companies they represent — a company with zero US customer conversions has nothing to hand to a partner. (2) Do not invest in US demand generation, events, or content marketing until the ICP and economic buyer framing are confirmed through at least one conversion. Marketing spend before ICP confirmation produces pipeline that does not convert and creates board-level false confidence in US commercial momentum.

Execution of these four actions within the stated windows is consistent with the documented configuration of Series A companies in this archetype that reached Partial Success or better.

9. METHODOLOGY

This Risk Verdict was generated using the Exported PRISM™ intelligence architecture — a multi-layer system built on 3,151 documented EU→US tech expansion cases (3,191 in the live database as of September 30, 2026). Every percentage, cohort comparison, and outcome figure cited in this document was derived from a live query against the Exported database or the trained Layer 2/3/4 model artifacts at time of generation. No figure in this document is modeled or estimated independently of documented cases.

Component	Specification
Dataset	3,151 documented EU→US tech expansion cases · 65 structured fields per case · live, continuously updated
PRISM™ scoring	5-dimension risk model · 84.4% top-quartile accuracy on negative outcome prediction · 1.967x above baseline
Layer 2 model	XGBoost · rolling-origin (walk-forward) cross-validated AUC 0.8931 · calibrated AUC 0.9680 · 90% confidence intervals on all probability outputs
Layer 3 engine	Case similarity matching · comparable cases selected by archetype, stage, GTM, and enrichment factor proximity · cosine similarity, 12 PCA components
Layer 4 model	Survival analysis · time-to-friction benchmarks by archetype and risk tier · concordance 0.7904
Update cadence	Outcomes verified and updated on a rolling basis — no static snapshot used in this report

No PitchBook, Gartner, CB Insights, or consulting firm operates a structured, outcome-verified EU→US expansion intelligence database at this depth or specificity. The intelligence in this report is pattern-matched against documented cases — it is not opinion, benchmark survey, or market analysis.

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